Attackers often use URLs to advertise scams or propagate malware. Because the reputation of a domain can be used to identify malicious behavior, miscreants often register these domains "just in time" before an attack. This paper explores the DNS behavior of attack domains, as identified by appearance in a spam trap, shortly after the domains were registered. We explore the behavioral properties of these domains from two perspectives: (1) the DNS infrastructure associated with the domain, as is observable from the resource records; and (2) the DNS lookup patterns from networks who are looking up the domains initially. Our analysis yields many findings that may ultimately be useful for early detection of malicious domains. By monitoring the infrastructure for these malicious domains, we find that about 55% of scam domains occur in attacks at least one day after registration, suggesting the potential for early discovery of malicious domains, solely based on properties of the DNS infrastructure that resolves those domains. We also find that there are a few regions of IP address space that host name servers and other types of servers for only malicious domains. Malicious domains have resource records that are distributed more widely across IP address space, and they are more quickly looked up by a variety of different networks. We also identify a set of "tainted" ASes that are used heavily by bad domains to host resource records. The features we observe are often evident before any attack even takes place; ultimately, they might serve as the basis for a DNS-based early warning system for attacks.
INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS), the Internet's lookup service for mapping names to IP addresses, provides a critical service for Internet applications; unfortunately, it also allows attackers to direct victims to Web sites that host scams, malware, and other malicious content. To mitigate these threats, network operators try to derive a reputation for each domain that reflects the likelihood that the domain is associated with a particular type of attack (e.g., scam, phishing, malware hosting). The rate at which new domains appear makes quickly developing a reputation for these domains particularly challenging: in our analysis, we find that over tens of thousands of new domains are registered every day. Existing DNS reputation systems use the characteristics of DNS lookups from resolvers that look up a domain to distinguish legitimate from malicious domains [1, 2] . Unfortunately, these systems must observe a significant volume of DNS lookups before determining the reputation for a domain, which only occurs after compromise has taken place.
Towards facilitating pre-attack detection of malicious domains, we study the initial DNS activity for each domain and characterize how the observable behavior for a malicious domain differs from that of legitimate domains. We study two aspects of initial DNS behavior associated with domains: (1) the DNS infrastructure used to resolve the domains to IP addresses; and (2) the DNS lookup patterns from the networks that perform initial lookups to the domain. Certain characteristics of the DNS infrastructure may be unique to malicious domains, such as the IP address ranges and ASes that host either the authoritative name servers for the sites, or the sites themselves. Identifying infrastructure that is common across malicious domains may provide hints for identifying malicious domains before the attacks themselves are mounted. Characteristics of early DNS lookups can help network operators discover valuable information about the nature of the domains that are being looked up. Notably, we find that domains that are registered for malicious purposes are initially queried from a much more diverse set of subnets than legitimate domains.
Our study of DNS behavior early in a domain's life cycle is motivated by our ultimate desire to perform early detection of malicious domains. We use domains collected at several large spam traps as a source of domains associated with spam campaigns. To characterize the resource record behavior of each domain, we perform periodic iterative queries of newly registered domains in March 2011. To characterize DNS lookup patterns across networks, we use information about DNS lookups collected from the Verisign top-level domain servers, coupled with registration information about these domains.
We focus exclusively on the early DNS behavior of a domain, which is enabled by two important pieces of information. First, registration records alert us when a domain is registered, and allow us to begin querying it immediately, before attacks. Second, we study a global view of early DNS lookup patterns across the entire Internet for .com and .net domains. Our study reveals the following findings:
• Domain registration and resource record establishment happens before attacks take place. As many as 55% of spam campaigns may occur at least one day after the domain referenced in the spam messages were registered, offering the potential for early discovery of malicious domains based on initial DNS behavior.
• DNS infrastructure for malicious domains is located in different address space regions and autonomous systems than the infrastructure for legitimate domains. A few autonomous systems and IP address regions host infrastructure only for domains that are associated with malicious activity. Identifying these at domain registration time can potentially enable early detection.
• Early lookup patterns for a newly registered malicious domains differ significantly from the patterns for a legitimate domain. Domains associated with spam campaigns are initially looked up by a more diverse set of network address regions than legitimate domains. Especially, the newly registered spam domains become "popular" more quickly.
These features may ultimately be used to develop unique fingerprints for distinguishing legitimate domains from those that are associated with Internet attacks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the problem context and related work. Section 3 describes the data sets that we use for our analysis. Section 4 studies the characteristics of resource records for newly registered legitimate and malicious domains. Section 5 studies the lookup characteristics for different types of domains, and Section 6 concludes.
CONTEXT AND RELATED WORK
We provide a brief overview of DNS records and lookups, as well as an overview of recent DNS studies.
DNS Resource Records and Lookups
When an entity registers a DNS domain, domain name registries insert several basic entries into the zone files to refer to the services for the domain. NS records point to the authoritative name servers for the zone, MX records point to the domain's mail servers, and A records point to the hosts. The NS and MX records can be further resolved to IP addresses. A single domain is typically assigned multiple server records for redundancy, but the number of IP addresses associated with the records is typically much less than the number of the domains being registered.
In March 2011, three million second-level domains under .com and .net were newly registered with NS records, but the number of distinct IPs mapped from NS records was just 150 thousand; A records and MX records have similar statistics. This observation indicates that the same server has been repeatedly used by many different domains to host DNS infrastructure (e.g., the most "heavily" used IP addresses carry NS records for around 300 scam domains).
Recursive DNS servers relay the users' queries to the zone's authoritative servers to acquire resource records, which reduces DNS traffic in the wide area. Recursive servers commonly respond to the hosts' requests within their respective networks, so the set of recursive servers querying for a domain can be a reasonable approximation for the networks that have attempted to reach the domain. The top-level domain (TLD) name servers thus provide a natural vantage point for monitoring the lookups directed to the second-level domains (the direct sub-domains below a TLD). Although DNS caching prevents us from determining the volume of lookups to a domain, the distribution of the recursive servers contains rich information about which networks have issued lookups for a domain; this statistic is particularly useful during the early part of a domain's life cycle, when it is initially registered and no caching has yet taken place.
Related Work
Monitoring and analysis on zones' resource records Previous studies have used the mechanism of querying the DNS servers to check the zones' resource records. Holz et al. investigated the diversity of the A records returned in the lookups to identify fastflux service networks [10] . Konte et al. studied the changing rates of the IP address in the DNS records of scam domains [12] . Our work, on the other hand, tracks DNS records of newly registered domains to infer spatial and temporal characteristics. Anax scanned the recursive servers to find out anomaly in the cached records and detect poisoning attacks [1] . In contrast, we monitor the records in the zones' authoritative servers to discover the characteristics in the malicious domains' registration.
DNS lookup patterns
The first studies of DNS lookup behavior at a local resolver were performed by Danzig et al. [8] and Jung et al. [11] ; both of these studies examined lookup behavior from the vantage point of lookups to a single local resolver, and did not attempt to characterize how these lookup patterns differed for malicious domains. Notos [2] and EXPOSURE [4] studied DNS lookup behavior within a local domain below the DNS resolvers to build the domains' reputation. Such a view of DNS lookup behavior is valuable, but this vantage point cannot reveal coordinated behavior across multiple networks, and it relies first on an attack to take place or hosts being compromised before it can detect any malicious domains. Antonakakis et al. also monitored the DNS traffic from authoritative servers or top-level domain servers to detect malware domains [3] , but the zones' dynamics were still reconstructed from DNS request and response messages; they did not focus on the behavioral analysis of newly registered domains. Other work has examined DNS lookup behavior at a DNS root server [5] [6] [7] . The focus of these studies was different from this paper. Castro et al. [7] and Brownlee et al. [6] attempted to characterize how much DNS traffic at the DNS root server was illegitimate. Broido et al. identified misconfigured hosts using spectrography to identify machines that were mistakenly issuing automatically configured DNS queries [5] . In contrast, we study DNS lookup patterns from the perspective of a top-level domain, and examines the behavior of lookups as seen from recursive resolvers, as opposed to lookups from individual hosts.
Domain registration inference
Recently, a number of research efforts have studied domain registration patterns. Kreibich et al. [13] investigated the time from a domain's registration to its use in spam. Spring et al. examined the delay between registration of a malware domain and the first successfully resolved response in DNS traffic [17] . We make a similar observation, but on a much larger set of domains under .com and .net; further, we explore the DNS characteristics in domains' early life cycle. Felegyhazi et al. [9] proposed to automatically identify malicious domains based on WHOIS and name server information. In contrast, we actively collect different types of resource records to track the changes, and monitor the networks querying the domains. Some of the charac- teristics that we observe about malicious domains could be used to build efficient dynamic reputation systems.
DATA COLLECTION
We describe our data and the process of probing for resource records and correlating with spam messages.
DNS data
The top-level domain servers are responsible for maintaining the zone information (more specific, second-level domains) and answer the queries for the registered domains. Verisign, Inc. operates the generic top-level domains (gTLDs) for .com and .net, which account for over 45% of registered domain names on the Internet [16] . The servers maintain two kinds of dynamics about the second-level domains. The first type of information is the Domain Name Zone Alert (DNZA). This information includes changes about the zone, such as whether a domain name was newly registered or a name server's IP address was modified. The DNZA files keep track of these changes.
The second type of information concerns the DNS queries issued by the recursive servers. After the recursive servers sent queries to the TLD name servers for resolving the second-level domains names, Verisign's systems aggregated the source IP addresses into /24 subnets for logging and the TLD name servers recorded the querying subnets each day. The query records show the relationship between the domain names and the queriers. Verisign deploys multiple TLD name servers to resolve second-level domain names, and we collected the logs of querying /24s from all servers for analysis. Table 1 shows the example format of each type of data. The DNZA entry indicates that an "add-new" command created a new domain example.com and the NS record was ns1.example.com; The query record means that there were queries from /24s of "111.111.111.0" and "22.22.22.0" for the domain. The DNZA files and the query data were collected at Verisign's .com and .net TLD name servers during the period of March 2011. On average, about 80 million domains were queried each day.
Resource records The DNZA entries with "add-new" commands show what domains are newly registered. To get the new zone's resource records, we must perform active queries to their authority servers, since the second-level domains' records are not available within the TLD name servers. After a second-level domain under .com or .net is registered, we probe the domain once a day to discover the resource records and the resolved IPs. As mentioned in Section 2, we collect NS, MX and A records. We performed the probing procedure during March 2011. For example, 190 thousand domains were created on March 1, 2011; we continually queried those domains over the next 30 days. At the end of March 2011, we accumulated 4 million domains for monitoring. We use the PlanetLab platform [14] to make it feasible to query a large set of domains. Each PlanetLab node is responsible to query a subset of domains, and deliver the collected information back to the central monitor. Eventually, we deployed around 150 PlanetLab nodes to perform the probing procedure throughout the month. Though the daily querying does not capture all the changes in the resource records, it continually tracks the "snapshots" of DNS infrastructure and implies the change trends.
Spamming Scam domains appearing in spam messages are the major targets in our study, since timestamps in each email help explicitly identify when the spamming activities occurred, and spam is related to many different attacks, such as phishing. We used spam trap to capture emails sent from spammers during March 2011. Because the domains for the spam trap have no legitimate email addresses, emails received at the mail server were all spam. The second-level domains appearing in the messages' URLs were extracted as being involved in spamming activities (overall, 40% of unique second-level domains were found under .com and .net). In the context of this paper, we use "scam domains" and "malicious domains" interchangeably to refer to the second-level domains identified being associated with spam. From spam traps, we identified 2, 045 scam domains as newly registered during March 2011. We also checked the domains with Spamhaus [15] , and identified 4, 587 blacklisted second-level domains. The union of these two sets yielded a total of 5, 988 .com and .net second-level domains that we considered spamming-related.
To obtain a representative set of legitimate domains for comparison, we sampled 6, 000 domains registered during March 2011 that have not yet appeared in any blacklist.
REGISTRATION & RESOURCE RECORDS
We first check the time between the registration of a domain and the subsequent attack to investigate the potential for early detection. Then, we explore how DNS behavior associated with infrastructure-where a domain's resolvers initially reside-can be an early signal for malicious domains.
Time Between Registration and Attack
We hypothesize that there may be some time between when spammers register new domains and when they send spam. We examine the extent of the delay between the time when a domain is initially registered and when it is ultimately used in an attack. If such a delay exists, it might allow blacklist operators to list the malicious domains, possibly before the spam campaign occurs. Figure 1 shows the distribution between the time when we start to observe records about the malicious domains registered in March 2011, and the earliest time when the domains appeared in the spam messages. We take the timestamps in our spam traps, as well as emails received at the Yahoo! mail servers. Yahoo! Inc. provides the received time of all email messages and the URLs contained in the messages. The Yahoo! email gives a broader coverage of monitoring around the world. We take the earliest time points when seeing a "bad" domain in email messages (either in Yahoo! data or in spam trap) as the estimated start of the spamming attack about that domain. The x-axis represents the delay between when a domain was registered and when we first witnessed the domain associated with a spam campaign, and the y-axis is the percentage of the malicious domains registered in March 2011.
How much time occurs between the domain registration and attack?

Finding 4.1 (Delay until attack)
More than 55% of the malicious domains appeared in spam campaigns more than one day after they were registered.
We define the first five days after domain registration as pre-attack period. About 20% of domains might not be used in attacks during this period, and the time windows for other domains being explored in spamming are also limited. In the rest of the paper, we will analyze the characteristics of DNS infrastructure for malicious domains both throughout their lifetime (i.e., after the domains' registration) and within the pre-attack period. In Section 5, we further investigate the lookup behavior during the early stage.
Location of DNS Infrastructure
When determining the IP address that maps to each DNS record, we find that the assigned records for spam domains across IP space are far from uniform.
How is the DNS infrastructure that hosts a domain initially distributed across IP address space?
The initial distribution of domain records across IP address space may provide clues as to a domain's reputation. Figure 2 shows how the IPs associated with NS, MX, and A records from malicious and legitimate domains are distributed across IP address space. The x-axis represents IPv4 space. If an IP maps to multiple records from different domains, we count it only once in the figure. The y-axis indicates the percentage of addresses less than or equal to the IP value on the x-axis. The solid blue curves plot the distribution of legitimate sample domains, the red dashed curves show the outcome of malicious domains, and the green dash-dot curves represent observed records for the malicious domains during pre-attack period. Interestingly, we observe that the DNS records associated with malicious domains are distributed differently than the records associated with legitimate ones. sufficient to confirm that a domain is scam-related. We examined the distribution of the resource records across ASes and compared the distribution of legitimate and malicious domains. Table 2 shows the top three ASes ranked by the percentage of domains ever having records being resolved into ASes. We observe that many of the new legitimate domains have larger registrars like GoDaddy operate their DNS, and host their service infrastructure with well-known provider, like Google. On the other hand, spamming domains' records are scattered across multiple ASes and countries. Spammers appear to prefer certain specific ASes to host their DNS infrastructure.
Are there "bad" ASes that host DNS infrastructure exclusively for malicious domains? We define an AS as "tainted" once the number of malicious domains whose DNS records are resolved within the AS exceeds a threshold. The set of tainted ASes represent the networks that attackers most heavily use, as indicated by the malicious domains' registration. After a domain's registration, attackers create DNS entries for the domain, and the records resolve to different IP addresses. We then check whether the resulting IPs belong to the tainted ASes. If a domain accumulates many records that resolve to tainted ASes, we suspect that the domain is related to the observed attacks. We derive the tainted AS set by including an AS that has hosted records for more than 100 spam domains. Figure 3 shows the ratio of the tainted record number to the number of all records for the domain. More than 90% of legitimate new domains have zero records belonging to the tainted AS set.
EARLY LOOKUP BEHAVIOR
The recursive DNS resolvers initially query the TLD name servers to get referrals to second-level domains. In this section, we explore the characteristics in the lookup networks to different types of domains. Queries to a malicious domain may signal the onset of attack, and the abnormal pattern in the global DNS traffic could help to detect the attack campaign in its infancy.
Network-Wide Patterns
We first investigate the querying patterns across different domains, to see whether similar sets of networks were looking up different domains. Our intuition is that domains that are used for malicious purposes may be looked up by similar groups of networks as well. For example, a user clicking on a URL in spam might click on other spam URLs. If two domains are queried by the same set of recursive DNS servers, they may be the same type of domain.
Are the networks querying different domains distributed similarly?
We measure the similarity using an average pairwise similarity of querying /24 network blocks over n days. Suppose two domains A and B who have sequences of querying /24 set {a1, a2, . . . , an} and {b1, b2, . . . , bn} over n days. The similarity between domains A and B is
where J(ai, bi) is the Jaccard index of set ai and bi: the size of the set intersection divided by the size of union. Based on this pairwise similarity, we aggregate the domains into different groups using single-linkage clustering, a simple and efficient clustering method [18] . We considered a 5-day time period from March 1- The results show that clustering often works well: many of the clusters contain either only all good or all bad domains. The legitimate domains contained in the large cluster are only queried by a small number of networks, which a detection system could easily filter. These results suggest that domains of certain types do share similar network-wide spatial lookup patterns that may ultimately be used as input to a blacklist.
Evolution of Lookup Traffic
The numbers of distinct networks querying the TLD servers for the second-level domains approximate how widely around the world the users try to connect to these domains. Although there might be multiple connection attempts behind one recursive server, counting all querying recursive servers is a good indicator for the domain's initial "popularity". Our intuition is that once deployed, malicious domains may receive a lot of traffic in a short time, but visits to legitimate domains will increase relatively more slowly. Figure 4 shows the average lookup volume from /24s for domains in different categories over time. The x-axis shows the number of days after a domains' registration. The y-axis shows the average number of querying /24s over the domains with error bars (i.e., standard error). The solid blue curve shows lookups for legitimate domains; the y-axis values are multiplied by 10 to make the figure more readable. The dashed red curve shows the patterns of malicious domains. 
How quickly do the newly registered domains become popular?
Finding 5.2 (Initial lookup trends) Queries to the malicious domains increased quickly after the domains were registered, and usually reached the peak in the first 3-4 days.
On the other hand, /24s querying for domains not reported as malicious increased slowly and stayed relatively low over the 30-day period. The markedly different lookup patterns of likely legitimate domains and those involved in spamming activities might ultimately help blacklist operators quickly detect bad domains, by watching for newly registered domains that suddenly become popular. The changes to malicious domains also indicate that the initial five-day period may contain valuable information, since these attack domains are heavily queried at the beginning, but lookups quickly trail off after that.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have monitored DNS resource records for second-level domains newly registered in March 2011 and examined the lookup traffic to large authoritative top-level domain servers. We show the DNS characteristics observed at TLD name servers and extracted from zones' resource records for malicious domains are different than those for legitimate domains. Resource records of malicious domains tend to resolve to specific IP address range and ASes. Once we identify a set of "tainted" autonomous systems that host many scam domains, the legitimate domains rarely have resource records within the tainted AS set. We also discover that miscreant domains exhibit distinct clusters, in terms of the networks that look up these domains. Finally, we find that these domains become widely popular considerably more quickly after their initial registration time.
The distinct DNS characteristics and their tendency on different types of domains suggest that it may ultimately be possible to fingerprint domains based on their resource records and lookup traffic close to TLD name servers before an attack ever takes place. Although a single pattern in DNS might have limited power to identify malicious domains, the combination of our findings may ultimately guide the design of future "early warning" systems for DNS.
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Weaknesses: Paper does not develop/evaluate a (new) technique for predicting whether a new domain is spam or not, but to be fair, that is probably out of scope for a short paper.
Comments to Authors:
This is well-written paper based on a relatively unique data set. There are no real "surprises", but the data is analyzed and presented well. It is not clear how useful the observations about spam domains are: for instance, knowing that most spam domains are not immediately used (Figure 1) , and that the distribution for MX/A/NS records of spam versus legitimate domains is different (Figure 2 ) is interesting but does not lead to a "test" for whether a single new domain is legitimate or not. Perhaps there is a method or perhaps a legitimate-use probability can be associated with a domain based on its initial behavior, but such a technique was not developed or evaluated in this paper.
In this short paper, we investigated the potential for using DNS lookup patterns for detection, since the paper is mainly to measure different features and leaves the detection system as future work. To address this comment, we added a paragraph in the conclusion section to discuss future work on detecting malicious versus legitimate domains.
In the absence of such a method, the paper does a competent job of presenting the data cleanly and drawing initial conclusions.
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Weaknesses:
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The first finding is not novel. Check the LEET 2009 Spamcraft paper for a plot documenting delays from registration time to time of use.
We have added this paper to the references, although our findings and conclusions are different from those from the Spamcraft paper. The previous work sees similar delays between registration and first lookup for a single campaign, but we focus on the time delay between registration and attack for .com and .net domains to investigate the possibility of early detection before the attack occurs.
Your second finding isn't particularly novel either. The proactive domain blacklisting paper from LEET 2010 is clearly related, as its authors tried to predict malicious domain use from the patterns of registration and the infrastructure touched by a domain's hosting. I'm surprised you don't cite it. You should also cite Spamhaus' DBL, as it too is a predictive spam blacklist. The third finding is interesting but it too has been covered in previous work, see Spring Given that all three features are promising I would suggest you actually try to build a predictor for malicious domains so you can report on its accuracy -it would be interesting (particularly its real-time aspects), and I am pretty sure it would work quite well.
Specific comments: -Sec. 2.1: "When a DNS domain is registered, several basic entries are inserted to refer to the services for the domain." Please make the writing more active --registered by whom, inserted where?
We changed this sentence to "When an entity registers a DNS domain, domain name registries insert several basic entries into the zone files to refer to the services for the domain." -Sec 3: again passive voice: "the source IP addresses were aggregated into /24 subnets and the TLD name servers recorded the number of queries for each domain". Is this something you did, or do Verisign's systems provide that?
Verisign provided the information. We changed this sentence to "Verisign's systems aggregated the source IP addresses into /24 subnets for logging and the TLD name servers recorded querying subnets each day." -How do the query record entries scale? It seems that the number of /24s must be huge for popular domains...
Since we recorded the querying /24s (not the individual queries), the data for each domain has an upper limit (at most the number of all /24s). Our work focuses on the newly registered domains, so fewer domains would get huge queries in a short time.
-Did you build your own PlanetLab experiment or did you use CoDNS?
We designed and built our own experimental platform. We must collect different types of records, including A, NS, and MX records, so we have built and deployed our own system to perform the tasks of resolving the domain names.
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We did not make any changes to the paper, but we will briefly clarify this question here. MX Section 4 is clearer in this respect, i.e., it says that malicious domains tend to be served by infrastructure that uses specific address blocks and few "tainted" ASes, which are rarely used by legitimate domains --implying that an early detection system could investigate domains that are served by these few tainted ASes. This makes sense. However, the numbers in Table 3 (on which this conclusion is based) are confusing: Apparently, the AS mostly used by malicious domains is the Chinanet Backbone AS. My understanding is that this AS hosts a large fraction of the Chinese Internet infrastructure. Hence, if we consider this AS "tainted", a large fraction of legitimate Chinese domains will have to be investigated as suspect of malicious behavior. This does not sound right. 
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-The main weakness is that it is not clear how to turn your findings into some practical policies to blacklist domains? You clearly show differences between legitimate and malicious domains, but can you use this information in practice? Would it be easy for domains to avoid the new blacklisting rules identified? I understand this is a short paper and I am hoping that you will cover this in future work. 
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The review comments fall into three categories.
1) Some related work is not included, and the differences from our paper are not described carefully. To correct this concern, we added most of the related papers pointed out by the reviewers, including "On the potential of proactive domain blacklisting" from LEET 2010 and "Correlating Domain Registrations and DNS First Activity in General and for Malware" from the SATIN 2011 workshop. There are three major differences of our work from earlier studies: we focus on newly registered second-level domains, the DNS records are actively probed instead of from passively monitoring, and we observe the lookup pattern at the TLD name servers (with a global view from all /24 networks across the Internet). We did not include several of the papers that reviewers mentioned that do not appear to be related to our paper.
2) It is unclear whether the DNS patterns could be eventually developed into a detection system. Since the intention of our work is to reveal DNS characteristics that could shed light on identifying different patterns for malicious and legitimate domains, the paper does not actually design a detection system based on the features (which is our next step). We changed text to make the claim clear, e.g. adding a paragraph in the conclusion section to state detection algorithms as future work.
3) Some details of the data and the findings need more clarification. To present the Verisign data more clearly, we checked the representativeness of the .com and .net domains and added more details to the paper about the collection process. We also added extra explanation explaining how we correlate secondlevel domains appearing in spamtrap URLs with those that appear in a Yahoo! email trace.
